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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL TAX LAW
TREATMENT OF NOMINEE CORPORATIONS
CARLA GREEN
I. INTRODUCTION
Nominee corporations are often used in business transactions,
particularly real estate deals, for a variety of nontax reasons. For
the purposes of this Comment, a nominee corporation is defined as
a corporation that holds legal title to property while beneficial
ownership remains in other parties or entities.1 The nontax reasons
for employing a nominee corporation include the circumvention of
interest rate limitations imposed by state usury laws upon
noncorporate borrowers; avoidance of personal liability for loans
obtained to acquire, improve, or refinance property in real estate
ventures; protection from attachment by, or the claims of, credi-
tors of the beneficial owners of the property transferred to the cor-
poration; facilitation of management or conveyance of property
owned by a group of investors; concealment of the identity of the
beneficial owners of the property; and prevention of problems that
might arise upon the death of an individual who held legal title to
property in his own name.2
The use of a nominee corporation to hold title to property, while
an effective arrangement for many purposes, may have significant
adverse tax consequences. Property dealings between the corpora-
tion and its shareholders may result in taxable gains or losses of
holding periods.3 More importantly, if the corporation is treated as
a viable separate taxable entity and has not made a subchapter S
election, income and losses from the property will be attributed to
the corporation during the time it holds title to the property. Al-
l. A variety of terms employed by writers to refer to what is herein called a "nominee
corporation" include "conduit corporation," "shell corporation," "straw corporation," and
"dummy corporation." Additionally, some writers define the term "nominee corporation"
differently than it is defined in this Comment. The reader should pay close attention to the
terminology and corresponding definitions employed in opinions and literature dealing with
nominee corporations.
2. Kalb & Lapidus, Nominee Corporations: Legislation Is the Only Solution, 5 J. REAL
EST. TAX'N 142, 143 (1978); Kronovet, Straw Corporations: When Will They Be Recognized;
What Can and Should Be Done, 39 J. TAX'N 54, 56 (1973); Kurtz & Kopp, Taxability of
Straw Corporations in Real Estate Transactions, 22 TAX LAW. 647, 647 (1969); Note, The
Use of Corporations in Real Estate Transactions: Judicial Acceptance of the Agency The-
ory, 8 J. CORP. L. 361, 361-62 (1983); Commentary, Federal Income Taxation and Real Es-
tate Development: Death Knell for Shell Corporations?, 56 Na. L. REv. 659, 659 (1977).
3. Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy is Dead, but the Dead Dummy
Should Live!, 34 TAx L. RED. 213, 214 (1979); Note, supra note 2, at 362-63.
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though income from the property may eventually reach the share-
holders through the dividend process, losses from the property will
never reach the shareholders but will be trapped at the corporate
level." Most business ventures depend heavily upon debt financing
to provide needed capital. The resulting interest deductions, cou-
pled with any available depreciation or accelerated cost recovery
deductions, often produce sufficient tax losses to shelter income
generated by the venture and income from other sources as well. 5
The lost availability of such tax losses can have a devastating ef-
fect on taxpayers.
In an effort to escape these adverse tax consequences, taxpayers
have presented two different arguments. The first argument advo-
cates disregard of the nominee corporation for tax purposes on the
theory that the corporation is too insubstantial and its activities
are too insignificant to warrant its treatment as a separate taxable
entity. This theory is commonly referred to as the "disregard the-
ory." The second approach admits the existence of the corporation
as a viable separate entity but argues that the corporation is the
agent of the taxpayers and performs its activities under their direc-
tion and on their behalf. This approach is called the "agency
theory." 6
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss recent developments
in the federal tax law treatment of nominee corporations. The dis-
cussion focuses on a series of opinions by the Tax Court and fed-
eral circuit courts of appeal that highlight the present controversy
over the proper tax treatment of these corporations. Both busi-
nessmen and tax practitioners are concerned with the tax conse-
quences flowing from the use of nominee corporations. The follow-
ing discussion is offered as an aid in determining not only what
those consequences are but also what they should be.
II. BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS: Moline Properties AND
National Carbide
A discussion of nominee corporations necessarily begins with the
consideration of two landmark Supreme Court cases, Moline
4. Miller, supra note 3, at 214; Note, supra note 2, at 363.
5. For an excellent discussion of the rudiments of tax shelters, see Weidner, Realty Shel-
ter Partnerships in a Nutshell, 8 IND. L. REV. 899, 899-900 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 363; Comment, Corporate Agents and the Flow-
Through of Tax Advantages, 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 798, 798-99 (1982). Differences in ter-
minology as discussed at supra note 1 may be encountered in discussions of these theories.
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Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner7 and National Carbide Corp. v.
Commissioner.8 These two cases are frequently cited and quoted in
nominee corporation cases. An understanding of their facts, hold-
ings, and dicta will provide an important background for the dis-
cussion of recent developments.
Moline Properties involved the use of a nominee corporation as
a security device. Under an arrangement suggested by the mortga-
gee of certain property owned by Uly Thompson, Thompson
formed the taxpayer corporation. Thompson conveyed the prop-
erty to the corporation, which assumed his mortgages. In exchange,
Thompson received stock in the nominee corporation. Thompson
transferred the stock to a voting trustee, who held the stock as
security for an additional loan made by the mortgagee to Thomp-
son. Thompson later repaid the loan and refinanced the mortgages
with a different mortgagee, and the stock was transferred back to
Thompson. Following these transactions, the property was sold.
Part of the sale proceeds was used to pay off the new mortgage
liability and the remainder was received by the taxpayer.'
The corporation conducted no activity following the final sale of
the property. Prior to the sale, the corporation's activities con-
sisted of assuming one of Thompson's obligations, defending con-
demnation proceedings, instituting a lawsuit to remove prior re-
strictions on the property, and leasing a portion of the property for
use as a parking lot. The corporation kept no books, maintained no
bank account, and owned no assets other than the property. The
corporation originally reported the gain from the sale of the prop-
erty, but Thompson later filed a refund claim on behalf of the cor-
poration and attempted to report the gain as income taxable to
himself."
The Supreme Court rejected the taxpayer's position that the
corporation should be disregarded and held that the corporation
had a tax identity distinct from its sole stockholder." Declining to
rule that a corporation could never be disregarded, the Court in-
stead laid down a test which focuses on the purpose and activities
of the corporation:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in busi-
7. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
8. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
9. 319 U.S. at 437.
10. Id. at 437-38.
11. Id. at 440.
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ness life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the
law of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the
demands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undis-
closed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by
the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable
entity.2
The taxpayer in Moline Properties argued not only the disregard
theory but also that the corporation was the sole stockholder's
agent. The Court, however, found no agency contract or any of the
"usual incidents of an agency relationship"'13 and observed that
"the mere fact of the existence of a corporation . . . does not make
the corporation the agent of its stockholders." For these reasons,
the question of agency turned on the same legal issues as did the
question of identity. Therefore, the court rejected the agency argu-
ment and held the income taxable to the corporation.14
Six years after Moline Properties, the Supreme Court revisited
the nominee corporation issue in National Carbide Corp. v. Corn-
missioner,16 in which the agency theory was central to the tax-
payer's argument. In National Carbide, the taxpayers were three
wholly-owned subsidiaries of a parent corporation, which had an
agency contract with each of the subsidiary corporations. The con-
tracts provided that the subsidiaries were employed as agents to
manage and operate production plants and to sell the output; the
parent was to furnish capital, management, and office facilities.
The subsidiaries agreed to pay the bulk of their profits to the par-
ent. The parent reported the amounts paid to it by the subsidiaries
as income, and the subsidiaries reported as their income the nomi-
nal amounts retained. The Commissioner notified the subsidiaries
of deficiencies resulting from their failure to include amounts paid
to the parent in their own income."8
Rejecting the taxpayers' characterization of the relationship with
the parent as an agency relationship, the Court held that the sub-
sidiaries should be taxed on the combined amount of income paid
to the parent and income retained.'7 As in Moline Properties, the
Court ruled that the question of whether the arrangement between
12. Id. at 438-39 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 440.
14. Id. at 440-41.
15. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
16. Id. at 424-26.
17. Id. at 439.
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the parties contains the "usual incidents of an agency relation-
ship" 8 depends upon the same legal issues which are pertinent to
the question of identity.' 9 The National Carbide Court's holding
that the subsidiaries were not agents of the parent was apparently
based upon the finding that the subsidiaries, and not the parent,
held title to the income-producing assets and upon the Court's de-
termination that the bulk of the subsidiaries' earnings was turned
over to the parent "not because the latter could command this in-
come if [the subsidiaries] were owned by third persons, but be-
cause [the parent owned] and thus completely dominate[d] the
subsidiaries."20 Despite the finding that an agency relationship did
not exist in that case, the National Carbide Court was careful to
state:
What we have said does not foreclose a true corporate agent or
trustee from handling the property and income of its owner-prin-
cipal without being taxable therefor. Whether the corporation op-
erates in the name and for the account of the principal, binds the
principal by its actions, transmits money received to the princi-
pal, and whether receipt of income is attributable to the services
of employees of the principal and to assets belonging to the prin-
cipal are some of the relevant considerations in determining
whether a true agency exists. If the corporation is a true agent, its
relations with its principal must not be dependent upon the fact
that it is owned by the principal, if such is the case. Its business
purpose must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an
agent.2'
The Court in Moline Properties and National Carbide left open
the possibility that a nominee corporation could, in an appropriate
case, escape taxation as a separate entity. Such an outcome would
permit income and losses to flow through the corporation to the
beneficial owners of the property.22 In an effort to achieve this re-
sult, taxpayers over the years have attempted to properly structure
their dealings with the nominee corporation, to appropriately doc-
ument that relationship, and to carefully specify and monitor the
corporation's activities. Until recently, however, taxpayers have en-
joyed little success under either the disregard or the agency
18. Id. at 427.
19. Id. at 430.
20. Id. at 438. See Miller, supra note 3, at 247-48.
21. 336 U.S. at 437.
22. See supra notes 12, 21 and accompanying text.
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theory.23
The Moline Properties disregard theory has proven to be un-
availing in most situations because "business activity" is so easily
established by the government.24 For example, the existence of a
corporation merely as a means of circumventing a state's usury law
restrictions on noncorporate borrowers25 has been held to consti-
tute a sufficient business purpose to prevent a corporation from
being disregarded as a separate entity for federal tax law pur-
poses.28 The agency theory also has been frequently unavailing be-
cause of the position taken by some courts that failure under the
disregard theory necessarily dictates failure under the agency the-
ory27 and because of the manner in which some courts have inter-
preted and applied the National Carbide test. 28 In several recent
cases, however, taxpayers have abandoned the disregard theory by
conceding the existence of the corporation as a viable entity and
have focused their arguments on the agency theory.29 In some of
these cases the taxpayers have prevailed. Thus the disregard the-
ory currently offers little promise and, when argued alternatively
with the agency theory, may hinder a taxpayer's chances under the
agency theory. On the other hand, the agency theory, particularly
23. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF. CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS $ 2.10 (4th ed. 1979).
24. See Baker & Rothman, Straw Corporations: New Cases Shed Light on Tax-Recogni-
tion Criteria, 45 J. TAX'N 84, 86-87 (1976); Note, supra note 2, at 365; see also Commentary,
supra note 2, at 665:
[T]he only time a corporation will be disregarded for tax purposes under the Mo-
line Properties doctrine is when it serves no corporate business purpose with re-
spect to the property it holds, but only takes and holds title to such property.
• . .[T]he business purpose in question must be one which is germane to the
functioning of the corporation. The Moline Properties test becomes: Is the corpo-
ration required to carry out any functions with respect to the property trans-
ferred to it in order to carry out the business purpose of the beneficial owners? If
the answer is "yes" the corporation will, much more often than not, be charged
with the beneficial ownership of the property and the consequent tax burdens.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
25. See Note, supra note 2, at 363.
26. E.g., Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986, 989 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983); Ourisman v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 171, 177 n.4 (1984) (citing numerous authorities), vacated and re-
manded, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985).
27. See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc., 319 U.S. at 440-41; Bolger v. Commissioner, 59
T.C. 760, 767 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745, 754-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981).
29. Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941, 943 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1984), aff'g 3 Cl. Ct. 316
(1983) (taxpayer failed on agency theory); Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276, 280 (5th
Cir. 1984) (taxpayer prevailed on agency theory); Ourisman, 760 F.2d 541, 545 n.6 (taxpayer
failed on agency theory); Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 988-89 (taxpayer failed on agency theory).
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when argued alone, does afford taxpayers a viable and potentially
prevailing approach.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Roccaforte
In 1981, the Tax Court in Roccaforte v. Commissioner"0 issued
an opinion which is significant in the nominee corporation area.
The Tax Court held that a corporation was an agent of a partner-
ship and that the partnership, and not the corporation, was the
owner of certain real property for federal tax purposes.31 The de-
velopers in Roccaforte acquired certain real property and formed a
partnership with investors in order to construct and operate an
apartment complex upon the property.3 2 Construction financing,
arranged by developers, was made contingent upon the use of a
corporation. 3 The partnership therefore created a corporation
whose shareholders, directors, and officers were partners of the
partnership. The corporation and the partners executed a "nomi-
nee agreement" whereby the corporation was to hold title to the
real estate and act in accordance with the partners' instructions;
beneficial or equitable interest in the property was to remain in the
partnership. Under the agreement all proceeds from the property
were to belong to the partners, and the partners were to reimburse
the corporation for expenses but not for services. The agreement
emphasized that the individual partners, and not the corporation,
were the owners of the property. The corporation had no assets,
liabilities, income, or expenses and was formed solely to circum-
vent state usury laws."' After acquiring the property from the de-
velopers, the corporation executed a mortgage note to finance con-
struction of the apartment complex. Realizing that the corporation
was a shell, the lender required the developers to personally guar-
antee the note. 5 The corporation and the partners then entered
into an agency agreement, which reaffirmed the prior nominee
agreement and the fact that the individual partners were owners of
the property.3 6
30. 77 T.C. 263 (1981), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
31. Id. at 288.
32. Id. at 265.
33. Id. at 266.
34. Id. at 267-68, 270.
35. Id. at 269.
36. Id. at 270.
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Once the apartments were constructed and placed in service, the
project experienced cash-flow problems. Five of the original part-
ners and three new partners made capital contributions to the
partnership in order to pay expenses of the apartment complex.
These new partners, however, did not become shareholders of the
corporation. They believed that the corporation was the agent for
the partnership and that the partnership owned the property.37
Indicating that it was a "nominee corporation" which engaged in
"no activity," the corporation reported no income, losses, assets, or
liabilities on its federal income tax returns. The partners, on their
tax returns, claimed their distributive shares of losses resulting
from the partnership's operation of the apartments. The Commis-
sioner asserted that income and losses from the apartment project
should be attributed to the corporation, not to the partnership.
The taxpayers contended that since the corporation was the part-
nership's agent, the partners were entitled to the losses. Interest-
ingly, the taxpayers did not argue that the corporation should be
disregarded but admitted that the corporation was a viable
entity.38
The Tax Court in Roccaforte began its consideration of the tax-
payers' agency argument by noting that the Supreme Court in Mo-
line Properties recognized that "a factual setting might exist where
a court could accept the agency argument." 9 The Tax Court ob-
served that there were, in the facts of Roccaforte, an agency agree-
ment and certain "indicia of a true agent" that were not present in
Moline Properties.40 The Tax Court also noted that the Supreme
Court in National Carbide did not foreclose the possibility of a
viable agency relationship but did identify some indicia of a corpo-
rate agent.41 The court characterized the factors of the National
Carbide test as follows: (1) "whether the corporation operates in
the name and for the account of the partnership;" '42 (2) "whether
the principal (the partnership herein) is bound by the alleged cor-
porate-agent's actions; '43 (3) "whether the corporate agent trans-
mitted money received to the partnership;" (4) "whether receipt of
income is attributable to assets or employees of the partnership;"
37. Id. at 274-76.
38. Id. at 277-78.
39. Id. at 279.
40. Id. at 279-80.
41. Id. at 280.
42. Id. at 283.
43. Id. at 285.
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(5) "whether the corporate agent's relationship with the partner-
ship was [not] dependent on the fact that it was owned and con-
trolled by the partners;" 4 and (6) "whether the corporation's ac-
tivities were consistent with the normal duties of an agent.' 4 5
Applying the National Carbide test to the facts of Roccaforte,
the Tax Court found that the third factor was inapplicable, that
the first, second, fourth, and sixth factors were satisfactorily estab-
lished by the taxpayers, and that only the fifth factor was not suc-
cessfully proven. 4'6 Appearing to give equal weight to each factor
and appearing to be persuaded by the presence of a majority of the
applicable factors, the Tax Court determined that an agency rela-
tionship did exist. The court stated, "We believe that the entire
substance of the arrangement was one of an agency relationship,
and even the form (outside of the corporation's primary liability on
the mortgages) indicated the agency relationship that was in-
tended.' '47 The court noted that although the taxpayers desired to
operate in the partnership form, they were forced to create a cor-
poration in order to secure financing for their project. The court
further noted that the partners did not use the limited liability
associated with corporate form but remained subject to all claims
arising out of the project.48 The Tax Court held that "where the
corporation was formed solely to satisfy the requirement of the
44. Id. at 286.
45. Id. at 287.
46. Id. at 283-287. In the Tax Court's analysis, the first factor was deemed met because
the corporation could only act pursuant to the written direction of a committee of the inves-
tors, the corporation never represented itself as anything other than an agent of the partner-
ship, some of the partners backed the corporation's represention of its agent status by per-
sonally guaranteeing various loans, and banks and other third parties dealing with the
corporation were aware of its status. The second factor supported the partners' agency argu-
ment because creditors were aware that the corporation was representing itself as the part-
ners' agent, the partners themselves considered themselves bound by the corporation's ac-
tions, and all of the loans were guaranteed by some of the partners. The third factor was
deemed inapplicable to the building construction involved. The fourth factor was deter-
mined in favor of the partners because the apartment complex was an asset of the partner-
ship. The fifth factor was decided against the partners because the investors owned stock in
the corporation in precisely the same proportion as their original ownership interests in the
partnership, the corporation was controlled and dominated by the partners, the corporation
was not compensated for its services, and the corporation and the partnership did not deal
with one another at arm's-length. The sixth factor was affirmatively established by the part-
ners because they had been careful to endow the corporation with specific indicia of an
agency relationship and because the corporation merely held legal title to the property to
enable the partnership to satisfy the lenders' requirements for financing. See Note, supra
note 2, at 379 n.143.
47. 77 T.C. at 287. See Note, supra note 2, at 379.
48. 77 T.C. at 287-88.
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bank in complying with State usury laws and the indicia of an
agency relationship are present, we will respect the status of the
corporation as an agent of the partnership."'4 9
The Tax Court's decision in Roccaforte in favor of the taxpayers
was not unanimous. Judge Fay, in dissent, argued that the major-
ity treated the fifth factor as "merely one of six relevant factors,"
while, in his view, the National Carbide opinion makes the fifth
and sixth factors prerequisite to a finding that an agency relation-
ship exists. In support of this position, he pointed to the Supreme
Court's use of the word "must."5 0 Judge Fay also stated that the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to which an appeal from
Roccaforte would lie, has designated these last two factors as "cru-
cial." 1 Based on the National Carbide test and the majority's
findings of fact with respect to the fifth factor, he would have held
that the corporation was not, for tax purposes, a "mere agent of
the partnership."52
Another dissenter, Judge Nims, argued that under Moline
Properties the agency and entity questions depend upon the same
legal issues. An agency argument is therefore subsumed by a
court's finding that the activities of a corporation mandate its
treatment as a separate entity. He would have held either that the
corporation in Roccaforte was a viable entity, resulting in no
agency relationship, or that the corporation's relationship with the
partnership was a "sham, designed solely to thwart the law of Lou-
isiana." Judge Nims argued that the taxpayers could not invoke
the corporate form of doing business for state law purposes and at
the same time escape the adverse tax consequences of corporate
existence.5 -
One reason the Tax Court's decision in Roccaforte was signifi-
cant is that it represented to some observers a break from earlier
authority. Another reason for its importance is that the decision
involved a different interpretation of the National Carbide stan-
dard (one more sympathetic to taxpayers) than the interpretation
49. Id. at 288.
50. Id. at 290 (Fay, J., dissenting). For the fifth and sixth factors, the Supreme Court in
National Carbide stated, "[(5)] If the corporation is a true agent, its relations with its prin-
cipal must not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if such is the
case. [(6)] Its business purpose must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an agent."
336 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added).
51. 77 T.C. at 291. See Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745, 755 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 965 (1981).
52. 77 T.C. at 291.
53. Id. at 292-93 (Nims, J., dissenting).
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the Fifth Circuit had previously adopted." Not surprisingly, the
Tax Court's decision that the corporation in Roccaforte was a true
nontaxable agent of the principals was reversed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit55 on the grounds that the Tax Court misapplied the National
Carbide test." The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's fac-
tual determinations for each factor but rejected the treatment of
those factors as conditions entitled to equal weight:
The first four conditions set out in National Carbide are gen-
eral principles of agency law, and serve only as "relevant consid-
erations" in the determination of true agency status. The fifth
and sixth conditions, however, are mandatory and absolute ....
[They] are not mere factors of uncertain weight; they are prereq-
uisites which must be satisfied before a corporation can qualify as
a true agent.57
Because the corporation did not satisfy the mandatory fifth factor,
the Fifth Circuit determined as a matter of law that the corpora-
tion was not a true nontaxable agent.6 8 Voicing concerns that the
separate entity regime would collapse if any closely-held corpora-
tion was allowed to act as agent of its owners and at the same time
claim nontaxable status, the Fifth Circuit concluded that in order
to establish a recognizable agency relationship, a taxpayer "should
be required to show that an agency relationship could exist inde-
pendent of [the taxpayer's] ownership and control" of the corpora-
tion, precisely as the mandatory fifth condition of National Car-
bide requires.59
B. Ourisman
In 1984, the Tax Court in Ourisman v. Commissioner" revisited
the corporate agent issues presented in the earlier and factually
54. See Jones, 640 F.2d at 755.
55. Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 986-87.
57. Id. at 989.
58. Id. at 989-90.
59. Id. at 990.
If a taxpayer could, by the simple expedient of relying upon characteristics com-
mon to all such corporations, avoid tax liability, the separate entity regime would
collapse. To prevent abuse, the taxpayer should be required to show more than
those agency attributes that arise naturally from ownership and control of the
corporation . . ..
Id.
60. 82 T.C. 171 (1984).
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similar Roccaforte case. Unlike Roccaforte, however, an appeal
from the Ourisman case lay not to the Fifth Circuit but to the
Fourth Circuit or the District of Columbia Circuit. Thus, the Tax
Court was not required to follow the interpretation and application
of the National Carbide test given by the Fifth Circuit in
Roccaforte. 1
Real estate investor and developer Florenz Ourisman joined with
a construction company in leasing certain real property upon
which the parties intended to construct an office building.6 2 Ouris-
man and the construction company formed a partnership to de-
velop the property and applied for construction financing, listing
the partnership as "owner" of the property. A lender agreed to
provide interim construction financing for the building, provided
that the loan, because of state usury law restrictions, would be
made to the "corporate nominee" of the partnership. Accordingly,
the partnership formed a corporation that, on the date of forma-
tion, passed a resolution to act as nominee or agent for the part-
nership. In closing the construction loan, the corporation signed
the construction loan agreement, a promissory note, and a deed of
trust. Ourisman and the principal shareholders of the construction
company personally guaranteed payment of the loan. On the same
date as the loan closing, the partnership assigned the leasehold to
the corporation for a recited consideration of ten dollars. The as-
signment stated that the corporation would hold the lease and any
improvements upon the leased property, borrow and repay interim
financing, and construct a six-story office building "solely as nomi-
nee, dummy and straw party for the [p]artnership" and that the
"[p]artnership is and shall continue to be the [c]orporation's prin-
cipal, the true and lawful owner of the leasehold [and] all improve-
ments . . ., and the real party in interest.""4
Ourisman and the construction company eventually arranged for
permanent financing. Application for the permanent loan was
made in the name of the nominee corporation, but the application
specified that Ourisman and the construction company were the
owners of the building. The permanent loan, for which there was
no personal liability, was secured by a deed of trust. On the same
day as the permanent loan closing, the corporation reassigned the
61. Id. at 185. However, the Fourth Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
National Carbide. Ourisman v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985).
62. 82 T.C. at 172.
63. Id. at 173.
64. Id. at 174.
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leasehold to the partnership for a recited consideration of ten dol-
lars. The nominee corporation was later dissolved.65
During its existence, the corporation received no paid-in capital
or rental income. All loan proceed checks received by the corpora-
tion were endorsed to the partnership, which made the principal
and interest payments on the loans. The partnership paid all ex-
penses associated with the project and contracted for services in its
own name. The only party for whom the corporation performed
services was the partnership. 66
During the taxable years in question, the corporation reported
no income, listed no assets or liabilities, and indicated on its return
that its business was that of "corporate nominee." The partner-
ship, on the other hand, claimed losses attributable to the lease
and the building. The partners, Ourisman and the construction
company, deducted their respective shares of partnership losses on
the theory that the corporation acted solely as the agent of the
partnership, which, as principal, was responsible for the tax conse-
quences of the office building project.67 However, the Commis-
sioner asserted that the losses generated by the office building pro-
ject were properly attributable to the corporation rather than to
the partnership because no agency relationship recognizable for
federal tax purposes existed between the corporation and the
partnership. 6
The Tax Court observed that courts applying the Moline
Properties and National Carbide standards had found no agency
when "the relations between the corporation and its owners were
entirely consistent with the usual control exercised by shareholders
over a corporation. '" 69 However, the Tax Court also observed that
65. Id. at 175.
66. Id. at 175-76.
67. Id. at 176.
68. Id. at 176-77.
69. Id. at 179. The patterns recurring in those cases were as follows:
[T]he shareholders created the corporation to develop or manage their property;
the corporation acted only for its owners; the corporation turned over to its own-
ers all the profits earned by it on property to which it held title; the corporation
assumed liability for the loans used to finance the property; and the corporation
acted without renumeration.
Id. See generally Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981); Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga. 1974), affd per curiam, 514
F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975); Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d
623 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Vaughn v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 316
(1983), a/I'd, 740 F.2d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Stillman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 897 (1973);
Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
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some courts had held the corporation to be a nontaxable agent
when the corporation represented both its owners and unrelated
parties in the same transactions or when title to the property was
held by the corporation only at the time of financing and by the
owner at all other times.7
Applying the National Carbide test, the Tax Court determined
that the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth factors were estab-
lished.7 ' The fifth factor, however, was not met because the part-
ners' control over the corporation as shareholders determined the
corporation-partnership relationship. Each of the partners owned
the same percentage of interest in the corporation as in the part-
nership. The corporation was not compensated for its services and
did not act for any other principal. These circumstances were
deemed indicative of lack of arm's-length bargaining between the
partnership and the corporation with respect to the corporation's
services as agent.7 2
Even though the fifth factor of National Carbide was not satis-
fied, the Tax Court in Ourisman, as it had in Roccaforte, held that
the corporation was the partnership's agent and that the project's
losses belonged to the partners.3 In so holding, the Tax Court re-
jected the Fifth Circtiit's interpretation of the National Carbide
test and maintained its own interpretation, which does not require
the fifth factor to be satisfied in order for a valid agency relation-
ship to exist. The Tax Court held fast to its position that the Su-
preme Court did not intend that the agency criteria in National
Carbide should be a mechanical checklist, requiring satisfaction of
its fifth and sixth factors. Rather, the court was concerned with
"the essential nature of the relationship between the purported
corporate agent and its shareholders. ' 74 The court opined that if
the Fifth Circuit's approach were adopted, then a corporation
could never be its shareholder's agent, despite the presence of
other agency indicia, because the shareholders could control their
corporation in every case. The true meaning of the Supreme
Court's fifth factor in National Carbide is, in the eyes of the Tax
Court, that "the taxpayer must prove that the agency relationship
70. 82 T.C. at 179-80. See generally Raphan v. United States, 3 CI. Ct. 457 (1983), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233
(Ct. C1. 1969).
71. 82 T.C. at 181-83.
72. Id. at 184.
73. Id. at 188.
74. Id. at 185.
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existed independently of the shareholders' ownership and con-
trol. ' 75 The Tax Court held that the partners in Ourisman sus-
tained that burden.7 6
The Tax Court responded to the Fifth Circuit's argument in
Roccaforte that under the Tax Court's position, the security of the
separate entity regime was threatened because that position would
permit any closely held corporation to qualify as a nontaxable
agent. The Tax Court first noted that "[t]he rule of Moline
Properties, that the corporate entity will generally be respected for
tax purposes, is unshaken by our decision." The court then argued
that, in contrast to the facts of Ourisman, most closely held corpo-
rations are formed in order that the owners may avoid the liability
associated with being a principle. The Tax Court further asserted:
"To argue that our decision herein permits all closely held corpora-
tions to avoid tax as the agents of their shareholders is to ignore
the strictures of National Carbide." As the court explained, most
closely held corporations could not satisfy the conditions that
called for the finding of agency status in Ourisman: (1) the corpo-
ration had only negligible activities; (2) everyone dealing with the
corporation knew that the corporation was acting as an agent; and
(3) the partners performed all the substantial activities involved in
the project. The court concluded, "[N]ot to collect the corporate
income tax when such conditions are satisfied will clearly make no
significant difference in the scheme of Federal taxation."' 7
As in Roccaforte, the Tax Court's decision in Ourisman was not
unanimous. Judge Swift agreed with the majority's holding but not
its analysis of the fifth National Carbide factor. He argued that
the majority and the Fifth Circuit placed excessive emphasis upon
the principal's ownership of the corporate agent. In Judge Swift's
view, the focus of the fifth factor should be "on the manner and
degree the agency was represented to third parties and the degree
to which third parties acted in reliance upon the agency relation-
ship. ' 78 Because the representation of an agency relationship and
third party reliance thereon were significant facts in Ourisman,
Judge Swift concluded that National Carbide's fifth factor was
75. Id. at 186.
76. Id. See B. BiTrKER & J. EUSTicE, supra note 23, 1 2.10. "A better explanation of
[National Carbide and Moline Properties] is that the corporation must establish that it is
an agent for its shareholders . . . by evidence other than the control which shareholders
automatically possess over their corporations." Id. at 2-28.
77. 82 T.C. at 187.
78. Id. at 188 (Swift, J., concurring).
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satisfied. 79
As he had in Roccaforte, Judge Fay, dissenting in Ourisman,
maintained that the corporation was not the partnership's agent
under National Carbide because the agency relationship depended
upon the partners' ownership and control of the corporation."
Judge Cohen, dissenting in a separate opinion, disapproved of the
majority's decision because he viewed it as permitting a corpora-
tion which failed the subchapter S requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code to receive tax treatment comparable to that of a
valid subchapter S corporation. 1 Judge Cohen further reasoned
that the Supreme Court's statement in National Carbide which
left open the possibility that an agency relationship could exist be-
tween a corporation and one of its owners "does not compel a hold-
ing of agency in inappropriate circumstances" but rather "antici-
pates cases where the corporation serves as agent for unrelated
taxpayers, as well as its shareholders. '82
C. Moncrief
In 1984, the Fifth Circuit examined the agency theory once again
in Moncrief v. United States," a case decided subsequent to the
Tax Court's decision in Ourisman. Two individuals formed a lim-
ited partnership which owned an office building. Needing cash to
renovate the office building, the individuals arranged to form a
new partnership to which they would contribute their interests in
the office building plus another piece of real estate and to which a
third individual would contribute cash. Because the new partner
was slow in making his cash contribution, the partners deeded
their interests in the office building to one partner's wholly-owned
corporation, which was used strictly to borrow money. The corpo-
ration borrowed the necessary funds and then conveyed title back
to the limited partnership. The previously contemplated partner-
79. Id. at 189.
80. Id. at 190 (Fay, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 191 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 192. Additionally, Judge Cohen noted that it was not the Tax Court's function
to rewrite tax laws:
A fortiori, we should not decide cases as an accomodation to a perceived unfortu-
nate effect of nontax oriented local [usury] laws. I see no reason to depart from
the principles of those cases that hold that the taxpayer must take the chaff with
the wheat, or, if you will, with the straw.
Id. at 193.
83. 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984).
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ship was then formed. 8'
On his return, the cash-contributing partner claimed deductions
attributable to losses arising from the project. However, the Com-
missioner determined that the losses generated during the time the
corporation held legal title to the office building were attributable
to the corporation, not to the partnership. In a refund suit in fed-
eral district court, the cash partner argued that the partnership
was entitled to all tax losses associated with the office project on
the theory that the corporation was the agent of the partnership. 85
The partners had conceded that the corporation should not be dis-
regarded for tax purposes.8 The jury found that the corporation
was acting as the partnership's agent, but the district court
granted the government's motion for a judgment n.o.v. on the basis
that the partner had not met his burden of proof that an agency
relationship existed. 7
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, which was bound by its Roccaforte
decision and thus could not determine whether National Carbide's
fifth and sixth factors were mandatory, considered only whether
there was, in light of all six "factors," sufficient evidence to sup-
port the jury's findings. The court found that the first four factors
of the National Carbide test could have been found by the jury to
be satisfied based upon the evidence presented. 8 The court also
determined that although the jury had not been instructed that
the fifth and sixth factors were mandatory, there was no evidence
in the record to support a conclusion that either factor was unsat-
isfied. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the district
court and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the
verdict.8 9
In its consideration of the fifth factor, the Fifth Circuit first ob-
served a tension between the mandatory fifth factor and the Su-
preme Court's statement in National Carbide that a corporation is
not automatically foreclosed from being treated for tax purposes as
an agent of its owner-principal. However, the court did not find it
necessary to resolve that tension because it found that the princi-
pal (the partnership) in Moncrief was not the owner of the corpo-
84. Id. at 278-79.
85. Id. at 279.
86. Id. at 280.
87. Id. at 279.
88. Id. at 282-83.
89. Id. at 283, 286.
1985]
378 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:361
rate agent.90 Observing that the Moncrief case was similar to Roc-
caforte in many respects, the court found a difference with respect
to the "crucial" fifth factor. While the partners in Roccaforte ini-
tially had the same percentage of interest in the corporation as in
the partnership, the corporation in Moncrief was owned entirely
by one partner who had only a twenty-five percent interest in the
final partnership. The court stated that while Roccaforte appar-
ently did not require total coincidence of ownership between the
purported corporate agent and partnership principal (because of
the ten percent interest in the partnership later acquired by some
new partners who acquired no interest in the corporation), Rocca-
forte did not make clear the extent to which ownership must coin-
cide before the partnership can be said to own and control the cor-
poration. However, the partial coincidence of ownership present in
Roccaforte was sufficient to establish that the partnership in that
case did, in fact, own and control the corporation. 1
In considering whether the Moncrief corporation's relationship
with the partnership was dependent on the fact that it was owned
and controlled by the partners, the Fifth Circuit used the two in-
quiries given in Raphan v. United States:92 (1) whether the princi-
pal owned a controlling interest in the agent; or (2) whether the
90. Id. at 283.
91. Id. at 284.
92. 3 Cl. Ct. 457 (1983), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the
Federal Circuit upheld the Claims Court's finding that the corporate title holder of the
property was an agent of the partnership and that the partners were therefore entitled to
the losses from the project).
The Claims Court explained the National Carbide fifth factor as follows:
The crucial inquiry under National Carbide is the nature of the relationship
between the agent . . . and the principal . . . . If the two entities are affiliated,
the burden is on the taxpayer to show, in the words of Roccaforte, "that an agency
relationship could exist independent of such ownership and control." ... The two
entities can be affiliated in one of two ways. First, the principal can own a control-
ling interest in the agent; that was the situation in National Carbide. . . . Second,
the entities can be affiliated because the same parties own a controlling interest in
both.
3 Cl. Ct. at 461-62 (citations omitted).
As part of the second inquiry, the Raphan court considered whether the interest of the
partners were so closely aligned that the partners who held no stock could have controlled
the corporation through those partners who did hold stock in the corporation. The Claims
Court reasoned, "The fact that principal and agent were not commonly controlled entities
goes a long way toward allaying the concerns expressed in National Carbide." Id. at 462.
The Claims Court's allocation of the losses from the project among the partners, but not
its holding on the entitlement of the partnership to the losses, was overruled by Congress in
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 79(a), 98 Stat. 597 (codified at 26
U.S.C.S. § 752 note (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985)). No mention of this Act was made by the
Federal Circuit when it reversed the Claims Court's allocation of losses.
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same parties owned a controlling interest in both the principal and
the agent.9 3 Applying these considerations to the facts of Moncrief,
the Fifth Circuit found that the partnership did not directly own
stock in the corporation, that the same parties did not own a con-
trolling interest in both entities, and that there was no evidence
that the sole shareholder-partner was so closely aligned in interest
with the other partners that the latter could have exercised control
over the corporation."4 The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that
the nominee corporation in Moncrief was the agent of the
partnership. 5
In addition to finding the National Carbide test satisfied, the
Fifth Circuit perceived no "cogent policy grounds" for denying the
corporation agency status in Moncrief. The court explained:
The sole policy consideration enunciated in Roccaforte was that
the "separate entity regime would collapse" if the taxpayer could
predicate an agency relationship on characteristics common to all
closely-held corporations. In [Moncrief], the taxpayers have con-
ceded that the corporation was a separate entity. As National
Carbide instructs, the concerns raised with respect to agency rela-
tionships are not the same as the concerns raised by arguments of
"practical identity.""
D. The Fourth Circuit's Decision in Ourisman
Surprisingly, the Tax Court's decision that the corporation in
Ourisman was a true nontaxable agent of the principal was vacated
by the Fourth Circuit in 198597 on the grounds that the Tax Court
misinterpreted the National Carbide fifth factor.98 The Fourth
Circuit, giving literal effect to National Carbide's language
describing the fifth factor, agreed with the Fifth Circuit in Rocca-
forte that the fifth factor is mandatory and not just one of six fac-
tors of equal weight.99 The Fourth Circuit ruled that under the
fifth factor, "a corporation may not be a true nontaxable agent if
its relations with its principal are dependent upon the fact that it
93. 730 F.2d at 284.
94. 730 F.2d at 285.
95. Id. at 279, 286.
96. Id. at 286 (citation omitted).
97. Ourisman v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 541 (1985), vacating and remanding 82 T.C.
171 (1984).
98. 760 F.2d at 548.
99. Id. at 547.
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is owned by the principal." 100 Even though the Fourth Circuit
agreed that the "partners scrupulously structured their affairs,"
the court concluded that the corporation in Ourisman was not a
true agent because the partners failed to establish that the corpo-
ration's relationship with the partnership "was not dependent
upon the partners' ownership and control of the corporation. '" 10 1
Feeling constrained to follow a literal interpretation of National
Carbide in analyzing the agency relationship, the court of appeals
stated that "an agency agreement between shareholders and their
controlled corporation should not be given effect if the relationship
created thereby is entirely consistent with the control that share-
holders usually exercise over the corporation." 102 The court did
state that a closely-held corporation might satisfy the indepen-
dency required by the fifth factor, notwithstanding a principal's
ownership and control of an agent, if an arm's-length arrangement
between the corporation-agent and the partnership-principal is re-
flected in their relationship.1 0 3 The sole policy reason given by the
Fourth Circuit in support of its decision not to treat the corpora-
tion as a nontaxable agent of its controlling shareholders was the
prevention of the perceived abuse that would result if "sharehold-
ers with impunity could [otherwise] take advantage of the system
of separate taxation of corporations by treating their corporation
as a separate taxable entity with respect to some transactions while
treating the corporation as a nontaxable agent with respect to
other transactions. 1 0 4
IV. DIsCUSSION
In Roccaforte, Ourisman, and Moncrief, the taxpayers conceded
that their respective corporations were viable separate legal enti-
100. Id. at 547-48.
101. Id. at 548.
102. Id. at 548-49.
103. Id. at 548. The Fourth Circuit listed the following considerations as relevant to a
finding that an agency relationship was an arm's length arrangement:
the identity of ownership interests in the principal and agent. . .; whether a cor-
poration's articles of incorporation or the first corporate resolutions specifically
limit corporate purposes and powers so that the corporation may act only as an
agent for third parties . . .; whether the agent acts for more than one principal
; whether the agent has entered into a written agency contract setting forth
the duties and responsibilities of the agent and providing for a reasonable fee for
the agent's services...; and, whether the agent has collected a reasonable fee for
its services . . ..
Id. (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 549.
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ties. They avoided the disregard theory and focused their argu-
ments on the agency theory. This approach by the taxpayer is un-
derstandable given the way the taxpayers had structured their
dealings with their corporations, the ease with which the Commis-
sioner can establish business activity and thus defeat any attempt
to escape the Moline Properties standard for a separate taxable
entity, and the conclusion reached by some courts that failure
under the disregard theory necessarily results in failure under the
agency theory. In structuring transactions and in presenting their
position, taxpayers employing nominee corporations would be well-
advised to abandon the disregard approach in favor of the agency
approach. The desired tax result is more likely to be achieved
under the agency theory than under the disregard theory and is
more likely to result when the two are not argued alternatively. 10 5
Although the agency approach is the more promising of the two
theories in a nominee corporation case, taxpayers have not always
prevailed even when the agency theory has been argued alone. The
disparate outcomes in the cases may be explained in part by the
differing factual situations presented by the various cases, in part
by the differing judicial interpretations of the National Carbide
six-factor test and in part by the differing policy concerns of vari-
ous courts.
In Roccaforte, the Tax Court adopted an interpretation of the
National Carbide test that is more favorable to taxpayers than the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation. The Tax Court reaffirmed the posi-
tion it took in Roccaforte in the more recent Ourisman case,106 de-
spite the Fifth Circuit's reversal of Roccaforte.10 However, the
Tax Court's position has been reversed again, this time by the
Fourth Circuit in Ourisman,0 8 and the Tax Court has not had an
opportunity to respond to that decision.
The Fifth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit maintain that the fifth
National Carbide factor'0 9 is mandatory and absolute, while the
Tax Court believes that the factor is not crucial and that the Su-
105. See Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941, 943-44 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (the court
agreed with the taxpayer that the disregard and agency theories are not only distinct but
are in fact contradictory).
106. Ourisman v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 171 (1984), vacated and remanded, 760 F.2d
541 (4th Cir. 1985).
107. Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
108. Ourisman v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985).
109. "If the corporation is a true agent, its relations with its principal must not be de-
pendent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if such is the case." National Car-
bide, 336 U.S. at 437.
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preme Court did not intend to create a mechanical six-factor
checklist but was concerned about the essential nature of the rela-
tionship between the corporation and its shareholders. 10 As justifi-
cation for their position, the Fifth Circuit in Roccaforte and Mon-
crief and the Fourth Circuit in Ourisman relied heavily upon the
language "relations with its principal must not be dependent upon
the fact that it is owned by the principal." ' However, the Tax
Court's position that the quoted language means that "the tax-
payer must prove that the agency existed independently of the
shareholders' ownership and control""' 2 is an equally reasonable
interpretation of that language. Moreover, the Bittker and Eustice
treatise is supportive of the Tax Court's position and states:
Although [National Carbide and Moline Properties] are fre-
quently quoted in support of the theory that "business activity"
is inconsistent with an agency relationship between the corpora-
tion and its shareholders, they do not fully support this theory. A
better explanation of these cases is that the corporation must es-
tablish that it is an agent for its shareholders (with respect to the
transactions in question) by evidence other than the control
which shareholders automatically possess over their
corporations. 3
While similar, the facts of the Roccaforte and Moncrief cases are
viewed by the Fifth Circuit to diverge with respect to the "crucial"
fifth factor. The stock of the corporation in Roccaforte was issued
to the partners according to their proportional interests in the
partnership, but the stock of the corporation in Moncrief was
owned entirely by one individual who had only a twenty-five per-
cent interest in the partnership. In Roccaforte the Fifth Circuit
found the fifth factor unsatisfied, while in Moncrief that court
found the fifth factor was satisfied. " Interestingly, the Moncrief
court noted that Roccaforte would not require total coincidence of
ownership in the partnership principal and the corporate agent
before the partnership would be viewed as owning and controlling
the corporation. The fifth factor was not satisfied in Roccaforte
notwithstanding the fact that approximately two years following
the corporation's organization and the property transfer, three new
110. Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 185.
111. Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 989 (emphasis added).
112. Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 186.
113. B. BI'rKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 23, 2.10, at 2-28 (emphasis added).
114. See Moncrief, 730 F.2d at 284.
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partners received a total partnership interest of ten percent, but
received no corporate stock.
The court nevertheless determined that "the partners" owned
and controlled the corporation. . . . [I]n Roccaforte, . . . the
partnership entity, by pro rata ownership of all the corporate
stock among all the partners, directly owned and controlled the
corporation for over two years. When three new partners, with a
ten percent aggregate interest, were admitted in the third year,
the same parties continued to own a controlling interest in both
entities. The partnership entity's ownership and control of the
corporation was found to remain intact." 5
Thus, in Roccaforte, pro rata ownership of 100% of the stock by
the partners holding 90% of the partnership interest was sufficient
to establish direct ownership and control and defeat the fifth fac-
tor. In Moncrief, 100% ownership of the stock by one of three
partners, who was a 25% partner, was insufficient to establish di-
rect ownership and control; as a result, the fifth factor was met.
These cases leave open the question of what the outcome would be
in the Fifth Circuit with respect to the fifth factor in factual situa-
tions falling somewhere between those in Moncrief and Roccaforte.
The Fifth Circuit's approach in Moncrief was not merely one of
considering the numbers. Rather, the court of appeals, like the
Claims Court in Raphan1 6, "looked behind the 'paper' reality" to
determine whether there was such close alignment of interest be-
tween the stockholding partners and those who owned no stock
that the- latter, in reality, could control the corporation through the
stockholders."" Also, the Fifth Circuit did not limit its inquiry to
whether the same parties owned a controlling interest in the part-
nership and the corporation; the court considered whether the
partnership owned a controlling interest in the corporation. " " In
its analysis, the court endorsed the view of the Claims Court in
Raphan that the fifth factor is not satisfied if the principal owns a
controlling interest in the agent or if the same parties own a con-
trolling interest in both the partnership and the corporation. " 9
The Fifth Circuit's sole policy justification expressed in Rocca-
115. Id.
116. Raphan v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 457 (1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 759 F.2d
879 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
117. Moncrief, 730 F.2d at 285.
118. Id. at 285-86.
119. See Raphan, 3 C1. Ct. at 461-62.
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forte for denying the corporation agency status was a concern over
the potential collapse of the separate entity regime for tax pur-
poses. This policy concern was echoed by the Fourth Circuit in
Ourisman. Both courts believed the collapse would occur if a tax-
payer could establish an agency relationship on the basis of charac-
teristics common to all closely-held corporations. 120 In the later
Moncrief case, the Fifth Circuit raised no new policy concern but
justified its holding therein on the grounds that the facts of Mon-
crief did not implicate its earlier expressed concern." 1
The taxpayers in Ourisman convincingly argued to the Tax
Court that the Fifth Circuit's concern over the integrity of the sep-
arate entity tax regime was "based upon the incorrect assumption
that all closely-held corporations automatically satisfy the first
four National Carbide characteristics of an agency relationship." '122
The taxpayers explained that a closely-held corporation normally
does not represent itself as an agent of its owners or adopt agency
agreements because the owners of the corporation usually wish to
avoid personal liability for the corporation's obligations. Therefore,
the first two National Carbide indicia of an agency relationship
normally would not be satisfied. s2 3 Agreeing with this reasoning,
120. Ourisman, 760 F.2d at 549; Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 990.
121. Moncrief, 730 F.2d at 286. The Fifth Circuit did not clearly articulate its reasoning
in Moncrief, but its holding appears to be based on the fact that the taxpayers in Moncrief
conceded that the corporation was a separate entity and that, "[a]s National Carbide in-
structs, the concerns raised with respect to agency relationships are not the same as the
concerns raised by arguments of 'practical identity.'" Id.
122. Supplemental Brief for Petitioners at 2, Ourisman v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 171
(1984).
123. Id. at 2-3. The petitioners' supplemental brief states:
An examination of just the first two characteristics, namely (i) whether the corpo-
ration operates in the name and for the account of the principal and (ii) whether
the corporation binds the principal by its actions, reveals that this assumption is
invalid. A closely-held corporation is often formed for the principal purpose of
insulating its owners from personal liability. Consequently, such a corporation or-
dinarily does not represent to third parties that it is acting on behalf of and for
the account of its owners or that its actions are binding upon its owners. To do so
would provide third parties with an opportunity to pierce the corporate veil and
expose the owners to the personal liability they are seeking to avoid.
Similarly, a closely-held corporation generally does not enter a written agency
agreement with its owners or adopt a corporate resolution confirming its agency
status. Here again, such actions would increase the risk that the owners of the
corporation would be liable for the obligations of the corporation. In short, the
typical closely-held corporation does not meet the first two National Carbide
standards for agency. As a result, the Fifth Circuit's underlying assumption that
the mere assertion of characteristics common to all closely-held corporations is
sufficient to satisfy the first four National Carbide indicia of an agency relation-
ship is simply incorrect.
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the Tax Court in Ourisman said that "[in contrast to the facts of
the present case, most closely held corporations are formed pre-
cisely because their owners wish to avoid . .. the burdens of a
principal" and that the restrictions of National Carbide would not
permit all closely held corporations to use the Ourisman decision
to avoid tax as the agents of their shareholders.12
The arguments of the taxpayers and reasoning of the Tax Court
in Ourisman are persuasive and seem to overcome the Fifth Cir-
cuit's sole policy justification in Roccaforte for making the fifth
National Carbide factor mandatory. For that reason, the Fourth
Circuit's decision to vacate the Tax Court's decision in Ourisman
came as something of a surprise. The Fourth Circuit's opinion,
however, apparently was not based on the concern voiced by the
Fifth Circuit and answered by the Tax Court in Ourisman, but on
a new policy concern. The Fourth Circuit believed that if a corpo-
ration such as that in Ourisman were treated as its controlling
shareholders' nontaxable agent, "shareholders with impunity could
take advantage of the system of separate taxation of corporations
by treating their corporation as a separate taxable entity with re-
spect to some transactions while treating the corporation as a non-
taxable agent with respect to other transactions.' 12 5 However, even
if such "selection with impunity" is viewed as an abuse, this poten-
tial does not mandate denying all taxpayers the use of an agency
relationship when the fifth factor has not been met.126 First, there
was no abuse in Ourisman comparable to the Fourth Circuit's "se-
lection with impunity" concern in that Ourisman involved only
one transaction, not several transactions with differing tax conse-
quences to the corporation for each transaction. The court's con-
cern was, admittedly, based on a theoretical possibility. Second,
this "selection with impunity," which is the concern of the Fourth
Circuit, can just as easily occur in a corporation-partnership
agency relationship that satisfies all six of the National Carbide
criteria as in a situation where the fifth factor is not met. There-
fore, the Fourth Circuit's policy reason for vacating the Tax
Court's decision in Ourisman and denying that corporation the
Id.
124. Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 187.
125. Ourisman, 760 F.2d at 549.
126. Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 186. The Tax Court's explanation in Ourisman of the Su-
preme Court's articulation of the fifth National Carbide factor is plausible and finds sup-
port in B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTiCE, supra note 23, 2.10. See also Kurtz & Kopp, supra note
2, at 648; Miller, supra note 3, at 220; Note, supra note 2, at 367.
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status of nontaxable agent is not persuasive.
The recent cases discussed in this Comment indicate that tax-
payers have sometimes successfully established agency relation-
ships. Some cases involve situations where the fifth factor is met
while others involve situations where satisfaction of the fifth factor
is not mandatory. In situations where the fifth factor is a potential
obstacle, there is a possible arrangement (one not employed in any
of the cases discussed herein) which should be considered. The
fifth factor addresses only situations where the corporation is
owned by the principal, 12 7 and taxpayers always have the alterna-
tive of utilizing a corporation unrelated to the principal. Indeed,
the use of an unrelated entity to perform nominee functions has
been recommended in the past12 8 and generally remains a well-ad-
vised course of action for cautious taxpayers. Possibilities which
have been suggested include the use of an institutional organiza-
tion or the use of an "in-house" corporation whose stock is owned
by members of the client's accounting or law firm. 12 9 There are ad-
ditional considerations which are pertinent where the fifth factor is
a concern. It is generally helpful to the taxpayer's position for the
principal to pay the agent a reasonable fee for its services 30 and
for the corporation to serve as agent for other beneficial owners of
property.1 31 Finally, as in any nominee case, careful structuring
and appropriate documentation of the principal-agent relationship
are crucial. 32
127. "If the corporation is a true agent, its relations with its principal must not be de-
pendent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if such is the case." National
Carbide, 336 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added).
128. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 23, 2.10, at 2-29; Baker & Rothman,
supra note 24, at 88.
129. See Baker & Rothman, supra note 24, at 88; Kronovet, supra note 2, at 59-60.
130. Ourisman, 760 F.2d at 548. The Federal Circuit recently considered the agency ar-
gument in Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1984), a case decided after
Moncrief. However, that court did not have to decide whether it deemed the fifth factor
mandatory and absolute, as did the Fifth Circuit, because the Vaughn taxpayers failed to
satisfy other National Carbide factors. Id. at 947. In Vaughn, the Federal Circuit stated:
Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that the entities dealt with each other
at arm's length. Most telling is the fact that . . . the corporation never received
compensation for the substantial services rendered nor reimbursements for its ex-
penses. As other courts have found, an independent agent would not be willing to
perform services for its principal without compensation. See Roccaforte, 708 F.2d
at 990; Ourisman, 82 T.C. 171, 184 (1984).
740 F.2d at 945-46.
131. Ourisman, 760 F.2d at 548; see also Kronovet, supra note 2, at 60.
132. See B. BirrKEft & J. EUSTicE, supra note 23, $ 2.10.
NOMINEE CORPORATIONS
V. CONCLUSION
The use of nominee corporations in business transactions is ef-
fective to accomplish various taxpayer objectives. This arrange-
ment may have significant adverse tax consequences, however, if
the nominee corporation is treated as the beneficial owner of the
property to which it holds title. In the past, taxpayers seldom pre-
vailed under either the disregard or the agency theory when the
Commissioner challenged their treatment of income and losses
from the property as attributable to themselves rather than to the
nominee corporation. Recently, however, some taxpayers have suc-
cessfully utilized the agency argument.
The Tax Court is particularly receptive to the agency argument,
and its approach is laudable because it permits taxpayers to em-
ploy the useful nominee corporation device, without suffering ad-
verse tax consequences, in situations where there is no compelling
reason to deny them this flexibility and latitude in their business
and tax affairs. The Tax Court's interpretation and application of
National Carbide is readily supportable. Circuit courts which have
not yet addressed the agency argument in a nominee corporation
case should give serious consideration to adopting the Tax Court's
approach. In the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, where the fifth factor
is deemed mandatory, there nevertheless exist some factual situa-
tions involving partial coincidence of ownership where the fifth
factor may be met. When there is no solid policy reason to support
a different result, courts in the fourth and fifth circuit should not
hesitate to decide in favor of taxpayers with respect to the fifth
factor in those factual situations where they are not constrained by
precedent to decide otherwise. Finally, taxpayers in any circuit
should consider employing unrelated corporations so as to avoid
the potential obstacle to desired tax consequences which the fifth
National Carbide factor may present.
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